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Abstract
Strong theoretical guarantees of robustness can be given for ensembles of classifiers
generated by input randomization. Specifically, an `2 bounded adversary cannot
alter the ensemble prediction generated by an isotropic Gaussian perturbation,
where the radius for the adversary depends on both the variance of the perturbation
as well as the ensemble margin at the point of interest. We build on and considerably
expand this work across broad classes of perturbations. In particular, we offer
guarantees and develop algorithms for the discrete case where the adversary is
`0 bounded. Moreover, we exemplify how the guarantees can be tightened with
specific assumptions about the function class of the classifier such as a decision
tree. We empirically illustrate these results with and without functional restrictions
across image and molecule datasets.
1 Introduction
Many powerful classifiers lack robustness in the sense that a slight, potentially unnoticeable manipu-
lation of the input features, e.g., by an adversary, can cause the classifier to change its prediction [15].
The effect is clearly undesirable in decision critical applications. Indeed, a lot of recent work has
gone into analyzing such failures together with providing certificates of robustness.
Robustness can be defined with respect to a variety of metrics that bound the magnitude or the
type of adversarial manipulation. The most common approach to searching for violations is by
finding an adversarial example within a small neighborhood of the example in question, e.g., using
gradient-based algorithms [13, 15, 24]. The downside of such approaches is that failure to discover
an adversarial example does not mean that another technique could not find one. For this reason, a
recent line of work has instead focused on certificates of robustness, i.e., guarantees that ensure, for
specific classes of methods, that no adversarial examples exist within a certified region. Unfortunately,
obtaining exact guarantees can be computationally intractable [18, 23, 34], and guarantees that scale
to realistic architectures have remained somewhat conservative [7, 25, 36, 37, 40].
Ensemble classifiers have recently been shown to yield strong guarantees of robustness [6]. The
ensembles, in this case, are simply induced from randomly perturbing the input to a base classifier.
The guarantees state that, given an isotropic Gaussian perturbation of the input example, an adversary
cannot alter the prediction of the corresponding ensemble within an `2 radius, where the radius
depends on the noise variance as well as the ensemble margin at the given point [6].
In this work, we substantially extend robustness certificates for such noise-induced ensembles. We
provide guarantees for alternative metrics and noise distributions (e.g., uniform), develop a stratified
likelihood ratio analysis that allows us to provide tight certificates over discrete spaces with respect
to `0 distance. We also introduce scalable algorithms for computing the certificates. The guarantees
can be further tightened by introducing additional assumptions about the family of classifiers. We
illustrate this in the context of ensembles derived from decision trees. Empirically, our ensemble
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classifiers yield stronger certified guarantees with respect to `0 bounded adversaries across image and
molecule datasets in comparison to the previous methods adapted from continuous spaces.
2 Related Work
In a classification setting, the role of robust certificates is to guarantee a constant classification
within a local region; a certificate is always sufficient to claim robustness. When a certificate is
both sufficient and necessary, it is called an exact certificate. For example, the exact `2 certificate
of a linear classifier is the `2 distance between the classifier and a given point. Below we focus the
discussions on the recent development of robustness guarantees for deep networks.
Most of the exact methods are derived on piecewise linear networks, defined as any network archi-
tectures with piecewise linear activation functions. Such class of networks has a mix integer-linear
representation [20], which allows the usage of mix integer-linear programming [4, 9, 14, 23, 34] or
satisfiability modulo theories [3, 12, 18, 31] to find the exact adversary under an `q radius. However,
the exact method is in general NP-complete, and thus does not scale to large problems [34].
A certificate that only holds a sufficient condition is conservative but can be more scalable than exact
methods. Such guarantees may be derived as a linear program [37, 38], a semidefinite program [28,
29], or a dual optimization problem [10, 11] through relaxation. Alternative approaches conduct layer-
wise relaxations of feasible neuron values to derive the certificates [16, 25, 32, 36, 40]. Unfortunately,
there is no empirical evidence of an effective certificate from the above methods in large scale
problems. This does not entail that the certificates are not tight enough in practice; it might also be
attributed to the fact that it is challenging to obtain a robust network in a large scale setting.
Recent works propose a new modeling scheme that ensembles a classifier by input randomization [2,
22], mostly done via an isotropic Gaussian perturbation. Lecuyer et al. [19] first propose a certificate
based on differential privacy, which is improved by Li et al. [21] using Re´nyi divergence. Cohen et
al. [6] proceed with the analysis by proving the tight certificate with respect to all the measurable
classifiers based on the Neyman-Pearson Lemma [26], which yields the state-of-the-art provably
robust classifier. However, the tight certificate is tailored to an isotropic Gaussian perturbation and
`2 robustness, while we generalize the result across broad classes of perturbations and metrics. In
addition, we show that such tight guarantee can be tightened with assumptions about the classifier.
3 Robustness Certificates of Randomly Smoothed Classifiers
Given an input x ∈ X , a random perturbation φ assigns a probability mass/density Pr(φ(x) = z)
for each perturbed outcome z ∈ X . We can define a probabilistic classifier either by specifying the
associated conditional distribution P(y|x) for a class y ∈ Y or by viewing it as a random function
f(x) where the randomness in the output is independent for each x. We compose the perturbation
φ with a classifier f to get a randomly smoothed classifier Eφ[P(y|φ(x))], where the probability
for outputting a class y ∈ Y is denoted as Pr(f(φ(x)) = y). Under this setting, we develop tight
robustness guarantees of the probability Pr(f(φ(x)) = y) in this section, exemplify the framework
in §4, and illustrate how the guarantees can be refined with further assumption in §4.4. We defer all
the proofs to Appendix A.
3.1 Point-wise Robustness Certificates
Given a classifier f smoothed by a perturbation φ, we abbreviate the probability score Pr(f(φ(x)) =
y) for an input x and a label y as p, whenever f, φ,x and y is clear from the context. Given p, we
first identify a tight lower bound on the probability score Pr(f(φ(x¯)) = c) for another (neighboring)
point x¯ ∈ X . Here we denote the set of measurable classifiers with respect to φ as F . Without any
additional assumptions on f , the tight bound can be found by the minimization problem:
ρx,x¯(p) , min
f¯∈F :Pr(f¯(φ(x))=y)=p
Pr(f¯(φ(x¯)) = y). (1)
Intuitively, we can cast the optimization problem (1) as an assignment problem that initialize f¯(z) 6=
y,∀z ∈ X , and then assign f¯(z) = y for some z ∈ X until the constraint is met. Then a greedy
strategy that assigns f¯(z) = y in the order of decreasing likelihood ratio Pr(φ(x) = z)/Pr(φ(x¯) =
2
z) will achieve the minimum since the objective and the constraint can be rewritten as the measure
over the input space where f¯(z) = y with respect to the corresponding perturbations φ(x) and φ(x¯).
However, the above argument implicitly assumes that X is countable and the optimal f¯ is a determin-
istic classifier. Below we formally follow the idea to solve Eq. (1) without these assumptions. For
each point z ∈ X , we define the likelihood ratio ηx,x¯(z) , Pr(φ(x) = z)/Pr(φ(x¯) = z).1 If we
can partition X into n regions L1, . . . ,Ln : ∪ni=1Li = X for some n ∈ Z>0, such that the likelihood
ratio within each region Li is a constant ηi ∈ [0,∞): ηx,x¯(z) = ηi,∀z ∈ Li, then we can sort the
regions such that η1 ≥ η2 ≥ · · · ≥ ηn. Note that X can still be uncountable (see the example in
§4.1). Then,
Lemma 1. ∀x, x¯ ∈ X , p ∈ [0, 1], let H∗ , minH∈{1,...,n}:∑Hi=1 Pr(φ(x)∈Li)≥pH, then ηH∗ > 0,
any f∗ satisfying Eq. (2) is a minimizer of Eq. (1),
∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n},∀z ∈ Li,Pr(f∗(z) = y) =

1, if i < H∗,
p−∑H∗−1i=1 Pr(φ(x)∈Li)
Pr(φ(x)∈LH∗ ) , if i = H
∗,
0, if i > H∗.
(2)
and ρx,x¯(p) =
∑H∗−1
i=1 Pr(φ(x¯) ∈ Li) + (p−
∑H∗−1
i=1 Pr(φ(x) ∈ Li))/ηH∗
The minimization problem can be interpreted as a likelihood ratio testing [26], by casting Pr(φ(x) =
z) and Pr(φ(x¯) = z) as likelihoods for two hypothesis with the significance level p. Cohen et
al. [6] exploits the Neyman-Pearson lemma [26] to construct the bound for an isotropic Gaussian
perturbation, but we show in Remark 2 that our result is necessary to solve Eq. (1) in some cases.
Remark 2. The standard Neyman-Pearson Lemma [26] does not always suffice to solve Eq. (1) since
it can only assign a deterministic prediction across the entire region with the same likelihood ratio.
Assuming a countable X as in the extension to randomized tests [35] also does not always suffice.
Remark 3. ρx,x¯(p) is an increasing continuous function of p; if η1 < ∞, ρx,x¯(p) is a strictly
increasing continuous function of p; if η1 <∞ and ηn > 0, ρx,x¯ : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] is a bijection.
Remark 3 will be used in §4.2 to derive an efficient algorithm to compute robustness certificates.
3.2 Regional Robustness Certificates
We can extend the point-wise certificate ρx,x¯(p) to a regional certificate by examining the worst case
over the neighboring region around x. Formally, given an `q metric ‖ · ‖q , the neighborhood around
x with radius r is defined as Br,q(x) , {x¯ ∈ X : ‖x− x¯‖q ≤ r}. Assuming p = Pr(f(φ(x)) =
y) > 0.5 for a y ∈ Y , a robustness certificate on the `q radius can be found by
R(x, p, q) , sup r, s.t. min
x¯∈Br,q(x)
ρx,x¯(p) > 0.5. (3)
Note that here we assume Pr(f(φ(x)) = y) > 0.5 and ignore the case that 0.5 ≥ Pr(f(φ(x¯)) =
y) > maxy′ 6=y Pr(f(φ(x¯)) = y′). By definition, the radius R(x, p, q) is tight for binary classifi-
cation, and provides a reasonable sufficient condition to guarantee robustness for |Y| > 2. The
tight guarantee for |Y| > 2 will involve the maximum prediction probability over all the remaining
classes (see Theorem 1 of [6]). However, when the prediction probability p = Pr(f(φ(x)) = y) is
intractable to compute and relies on statistical estimation for each class y (e.g., when f is a deep
network), the tight guarantee is statistically challenging to obtain. The actual algorithm used by
Cohen et al. [6] is also a special case of Eq. (3).
4 Examples
In this section, we provide examples with efficient solutions to the optimization problem
minx¯∈Br,q(x) ρx,x¯(p) and thus the resulting certificate R(x, p, q). Specifically, we consider the
case where the random perturbation φ is i.i.d. in each coordinate via a randomized function ϕ:
φ(x) = φ(x1, . . . ,xd) = [ϕ(x1), . . . , ϕ(xd)]. (4)
1If Pr(φ(x¯) = z) = Pr(φ(x) = z) = 0, ηx,x¯(z) can be defined arbitrarily in [0,∞) without affecting the
solution in Lemma 1.
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We will start with the uniform perturbation in Rd as a warm-up example, and proceed to a more
complex scenario that yields a robustness certificate for `0 distance in a discrete space.
4.1 Warm-up: the Uniform Perturbation L4
L1
L3L2
x
x¯
Figure 1: Uniform
perturbations.
We consider a uniform perturbation in X = Rd with a parameter γ ∈ R>0 as
ϕ(xi) = xi + i, i
i.i.d.∼ Uniform([−γ, γ]),∀i ∈ {1, . . . , d}. (5)
Given a point of interest x and its prediction probability p for a class y, the
worst case prediction probability ρx,x¯(p) at another point x¯ has an analytical
solution via Lemma 1 since there are only 3 possible likelihood ratios ηx,x¯(z)
in the space: ∞, 1, and 0.2 If we denote the `∞-balls with radius γ around
x and x¯ as B1 and B2, respectively, then we can make L1 = B1\B2,L2 =
B1 ∩ B2,L3 = B2\B1, and L4 = X\(B1 ∪ B2) as illustrated in Figure 1. Using Lemma 1, we have{
ρx,x¯(p) = 0, if 0 ≤ p ≤ Pr(φ(x) ∈ L1),
ρx,x¯(p) = p− Pr(φ(x) ∈ L1), if 1 ≥ p > Pr(φ(x) ∈ L1),
where Pr(φ(x) ∈ L1) = Vol(B1\B2)/Vol(B1) and Vol(B1) is a constant. Hence, the minimizers of
minx¯∈Br,q(x) ρx,x¯(p) are simply the points that maximize the volume of B1\B2. Accordingly,
Proposition 4. If ϕ(·) is defined as Eq. (5), we have R(x, p, q = 1) = 2pγ−γ and R(x, p, q =
∞) = 2γ−2γ(1.5− p)1/d.
4.2 A Discrete Perturbation for `0 Robustness
We consider `0 robustness guarantees in a discrete spaceX =
{
0, 1K ,
2
K , . . . , 1
}d
for someK ∈ Z>0;
we define the following perturbation parameterized by a constant α ∈ (0, 1):{
Pr(ϕ(xi) = xi) = α,
Pr(ϕ(xi) = z) = (1− α)/K , β ∈ (0, 1/K), if z ∈
{
0, 1K ,
2
K , . . . , 1
}
and z 6= xi. (6)
Here ϕ(·) can be regarded as the composition of a Bernoulli distribution and a uniform distribution.
Due to the symmetry of the perturbation with respect to all the configurations of x, x¯ ∈ X such that
‖x− x¯‖0 = r (for some r ∈ Z≥0), we have the following Lemma for the equivalence of ρx,x¯:
Lemma 5. If ϕ(·) is defined as Eq. (6), given r ∈ Z≥0, define the canonical vectors xC ,
(0, 0, · · · , 0) and x¯C , (1, 1, · · · , 1, 0, 0, · · · , 0), where ‖x¯C‖1 = r. Let ρr , ρxC ,x¯C . Then for all
x, x¯ such that ‖x− x¯‖0 = r, we have ρx,x¯ = ρr.
1 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 1K 0 0
3
K 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
x¯C
z
xC
u = 4
v = 5
r = 4 d− r = 3
d = 7
Figure 2: Illustration for Eq. (7)
Based on Lemma 5, finding R(x, p, q) for a given p, it suffices to
find the maximum r such that ρr(p) > 0.5. Since the likelihood
ratio ηx,x¯(z) is always positive and finite, the inverse ρ−1r exists
(due to Remark 3), which allows us to pre-compute ρ−1r (0.5) and
check p > ρ−1r (0.5) for each r ∈ Z≥0, instead of computing
ρr(p) for each given p and r. Then R(x, p, q) is simply the
maximum r such that p > ρ−1r (0.5). Below we discuss how to
compute ρ−1r (0.5) in a scalable way. Our first step is to identify
a set of likelihood ratio regions L1, . . . ,Ln such that Pr(φ(x) ∈
Li) and Pr(φ(x¯) ∈ Li) as used in Lemma 1 can be computed
efficiently. Note that, due to Lemma 5, it suffices to consider
xC , x¯C such that ‖x¯C‖1 = r throughout the derivation.
For an `0 radius r ∈ Z≥0, ∀(u, v) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , d}2, we construct the region
L(u, v; r) , {z ∈ X : Pr(φ(xC) = z) = αd−uβu,Pr(φ(x¯C) = z) = αd−vβv}, (7)
which contains points that can be obtained by “flipping” u coordinates from xC or v coordinates from
x¯C . See Figure 2 for an illustration, where different colors represent different types of coordinates:
2For all z such that Pr(φ(x) = z) = Pr(φ(x¯) = z) = 0, we define ηx,x¯(z) = 0.
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orange means both xC , x¯C are flipped on this coordinate and they were initially the same; red means
both are flipped and were initially different; green means only xC is flipped and blue means only x¯C
is flipped. By denoting the numbers of these coordinates as i, j∗, u− i− j∗, v − i− j∗, respectively,
we have the following formula for computing the cardinality of each region |L(u, v; r)|.
Lemma 6. For any u, v ∈ {0, 1, . . . , d}, u ≤ v, r ∈ Z≥0 we have |L(u, v; r)| = |L(v, u; r)|, and
|L(u, v; r)| =
min(u,d−r,bu+v−r2 c)∑
i=max{0,v−r}
(K − 1)j∗r!
(u− i− j∗)!(v − i− j∗)!j∗!
Ki(d− r)!
(d− r − i)!i! ,
where j∗ , u+ v − 2i− r.
Therefore, for a fixed r, the complexity of computing all the cardinalities |L(u, v; r)| is Θ(d3).
Since each region L(u, v; r) has a constant likelihood ratio αv−uβu−v and we have ∪du=0 ∪dv=0L(u, v; r) = X , we can apply the regions to find the function ρx,x¯ = ρr via Lemma 1. Under
this representation, the number of nonempty likelihood ratio regions n is bounded by (d+ 1)2, the
perturbation probability Pr(φ(x) ∈ L(u, v; r)) used in Lemma 1 is simply αd−uβu|L(u, v; r)|, and
similarly for the Pr(φ(x¯) ∈ L(u, v; r)). Based on Lemma 1 and Lemma 6, we may use a for-loop
to compute the bijection ρr(·) for the input p until ρr(p) = 0.5, and return the corresponding p as
ρ−1r (0.5). The procedure is illustrated in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Computing ρ−1r (0.5)
1: sort {(ui, vi)}ni=1 by likelihood
ratio
2: p, ρr = 0, 0
3: for i = 1, . . . , n do
4: p′ = αd−uiβui
5: ρ′r = α
d−viβvi
6: ∆ρr = ρ′r × |L(ui, vi; r)|
7: if ρr + ∆ρr < 0.5 then
8: ρr = ρr + ∆ρr
9: p = p+p′×|L(ui, vi; r)|
10: else
11: p = p+ p′ × (0.5− ρr)/ρ′r
12: return p
13: end if
14: end for
Scalable implementation. In practice, Algorithm 1 can
be challenging to implement; the probability values (e.g.,
αd−uβu) can be extremely small, which is infeasible to be
computationally represented using floating points. If we set
α to be a rational number, both α and β can be represented
in fractions, and thus all the corresponding probability values
can be represented by two (large) integers; we also observe
that computing the (large) cardinality |L(u, v; r)| is feasible
in modern large integer computation frameworks in practice
(e.g., python), which motivates us to adapt the computation
in Algorithm 1 to large integers.
For simplicity, we assume α = α′/100 with some α′ ∈
Z : 100 ≥ α′ ≥ 0. If we define α˜ , 100Kα ∈ Z, β˜ ,
100Kβ ∈ Z, we may implement Algorithm 1 in terms of the
non-normalized, integer version α˜, β˜. Specifically, we replace
α, β and the constant 0.5 with α˜, β˜ and 50K × (100K)d−1,
respectively. Then all the computations in Algorithm 1 can be trivially adapted except the division
(0.5− ρr)/ρ′r. Since the division is bounded by |L(ui, vi; r)| (see the comparison between line 9 and
line 11), we can implement the division by a binary search over {1, 2 . . . , |L{mi, ni}|}, which will
result in an upper bound with an error bounded by ρ′r in the original space, which is in turn bounded
by αd assuming α > β. Finally, to map the computed, unnormalized ρ−1r (0.5), denoted as ρ˜
−1
r (0.5),
back to the original space, we find an upper bound of the division ρ−1r (0.5) up to the precision of
10−c for some c ∈ Z>0 (we set c = 20 in the experiments): we find the smallest upper bound of
ρ˜−1r (0.5) ≤ ρˆ× (10K)c(100K)d−c over ρˆ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 10c} via binary search, and report an upper
bound of ρ−1r (0.5) as ρˆ × 10−c with an error bounded by 10−c + αd in total. Note that an upper
bound of ρ−1r (0.5) is still a valid certificate.
As a side note, simply computing the probabilities in the log-domain will lead to uncontrollable
approximate results due to floating point arithmetic; using large integers to ensure a verifiable
approximation error in Algorithm 1 is necessary to ensure a computationally accurate certificate.
4.3 Connection Between the Discrete Perturbation and an Isotropic Gaussian Perturbation
When the inputs are binary vectors X = {0, 1}d, one may still apply the prior work [6] using an
isotropic Gaussian perturbation φ to obtain an `0 certificates since there is a bijection between `0 and
`2 distance in {0, 1}d. If one uses a denoising function ζ(·) that projects each perturbed coordinate
φ(x)i ∈ R back to the space {0, 1} using the (likelihood ratio testing) rule
ζ(φ(x))i = I{φ(x)i > 0.5} = I{ϕ(xi) > 0.5},∀i ∈ [d],
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then the composition ζ ◦ φ is equivalent to our discrete perturbation with α = Φ(0.5;µ = 0, σ2),
where Φ is the CDF function of the Gaussian perturbation with mean µ and variance σ2.
If one applies a classifier upon the composition (or, equivalently, the discrete perturbation), then
the certificates obtained via the discrete perturbation is always tighter than the one via Gaussian
perturbation. Concretely, we denote Fζ ⊂ F as the set of measurable functions with respect to the
Gaussian perturbation that can be written as the composition f¯ ′ ◦ ζ for some f¯ ′, and we have
min
f¯∈Fζ :Pr(f¯(φ(x))=y)=p
Pr(f¯(φ(x¯)) = y) ≥ min
f¯∈F :Pr(f¯(φ(x))=y)=p
Pr(f¯(φ(x¯)) = y),
where the LHS corresponds to the certificate derived from the discrete perturbation (i.e., applying ζ
to an isotropic Gaussian), and the RHS corresponds to the certificate from the Gaussian perturbation.
4.4 A Certificate with Additional Assumptions
In the previous analyses, we assume nothing but the measurability of the classifier. If we further make
assumptions about the functional class of the classifier, we can obtain a tighter certificate than the
ones derived in §3. Assuming an extra denoising step in the classifier over a Gaussian perturbation as
illustrated in §4.3 is one example.
Here we illustrate the idea with another example. We assume that the inputs are binary vectors
X = {0, 1}d, the outputs are binary Y = {0, 1}, and that the classifier is a decision tree that each
input coordinate can be used at most once in the entire tree. Under the discrete perturbation, the
prediction probability under the perturbation can be computed via tree recursion, since a decision tree
over the discrete perturbation can be interpreted assigning a probability of visiting the left child and the
right child for each decision node. To elaborate, we denote idx[i], left[i], and right[i] as the split
feature index, the left child and the right child of the ith node. Without loss of generality, we assume
that each decision node i routes its input to the right branch if xidx[i] = 1. Then Pr(f(φ(x)) = 1)
can be found by the recursion
pred[i] = αI{xidx[i]=1}βI{xidx[i]=0}pred[right[i]] + αI{xidx[i]=0}βI{xidx[i]=1}pred[left[i]], (8)
where the boundary condition is the output of the leaf nodes. Effectively, we are recursively
aggregating the partial solutions found in the left subtree and the right subtree rooted at each node i,
and pred[root] is the final prediction probability. Note that changing one input coordinate in xk is
equivalent to changing the recursion in the corresponding unique node i′ (if exists) that uses feature k
as the splitting index, which gives
pred[i′] = αI{xidx[i′]=0}βI{xidx[i′]=1}pred[right[i′]] + αI{xidx[i′]=1}βI{xidx[i′]=0}pred[left[i′]].
In addition, changes in the left subtree do not affect the partial solution found in the right subtree,
and vice versa. Hence, we may use dynamic programming to find the exact adversary under each `0
radius r by aggregating the worst case changes found in the left subtree and the right subtree rooted
at each node i. See Appendix B.1 for details.
4.5 Learning and Prediction in Practice
Since we focus on the development of certificates, here we only briefly discuss how we train the
classifiers and compute the prediction probability Pr(f(φ(x)) = y) in practice.
Deep networks: We follow the approach proposed by the prior work [19]: training is conducted
on samples drawn from the input perturbation via a cross entropy loss. The prediction probability
Pr(f(φ(x)) = y) is estimated by the lower bound of the Clopper-Pearson Bernoulli confidence
interval [5] with 100K samples drawn from the perturbation and the 99.9% confidence level. Since
ρx,x¯(p) is an increasing function of p (Remark 3), a lower bound of p entails a valid certificate.
Decision trees: we train the decision tree greedily in a breadth-first ordering with a depth limit; for
each split, we only search coordinates that are not used before to enforce the functional constraint in
§4.4, and optimize a weighted gini index, which weights each training example x by the probability
that it is routed to the node by the discrete perturbation. The details of the training algorithm is in
Appendix B.2. The prediction probability is computed by Eq. (8).
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Table 1: Randomly smoothed CNN models on the MNIST dataset. The first two rows refer to the
same model with certificates computed via different methods (see details in §4.3).
φ Certificate µ(R)
ACC@r
r = 1 r = 2 r = 3 r = 4 r = 5 r = 6 r = 7
D D 3.456 0.921 0.774 0.539 0.524 0.357 0.202 0.097
D N [6] 1.799 0.830 0.557 0.272 0.119 0.021 0.000 0.000
N N [6] 2.378 0.884 0.701 0.464 0.252 0.078 0.000 0.000
5 Experiment
In this section, we validate the robustness certificates of the proposed discrete perturbation (D) in
`0 norm. We compare to the state-of-the-art isotropic Gaussian perturbation (N ) [6], since an `0
certificate with radius r in X = {0, 1K , . . . , 1}d can be obtained from an `2 certificate with radius√
r. Note that the derived `0 certificate from Gaussian perturbation is still tight with respect to all the
measurable classifiers (see Theorem 1 in [6]). We consider the following evaluation measures:
• µ(R): the average certified `0 radius R(x, p, q) (with respect to the labels) across the testing set.
• ACC@r: the certified accuracy within a radius r (the average I{R(x, p, q) > r} in the testing set).
5.1 Binarized MNIST
We use a 55, 000/5, 000/10, 000 split of the MNIST dataset for training/validation/testing. For each
data pointx in the dataset, we binarize each coordinate by setting the threshold as 0.5. Experiments are
conducted on randomly smoothed CNN models and the implementation details are in Appendix C.1.
The results are shown in Table 1. For the same randomly smoothed CNN model (the 1st and 2nd
rows in Table 1), our certificates are consistently better than the ones derived from the Gaussian
perturbation (see §4.3). The gap between the average certified radius is about 1.7 in `0 distance, and
the gap between the certified accuracy can be as large as 0.4. Compared to the models trained with
Gaussian noise (the 3rd row in Table 1), our model is also consistently better in terms of the measures.
Since the above comparison between our certificates and the Gaussian-based certificates is relative,
we conduct an exhaustive search over all the possible adversary within `0 radii 1 and 2 to study the
tightness against the exact certificate. The resulting certified accuracies at radii 1 and 2 are 0.954
and 0.926, respectively, which suggest that our certificate is reasonably tight when r = 1 (0.954 vs.
0.921), but still too pessimistic when r = 2 (0.926 vs. 0.774). The phenomenon is expected since the
certificate is based on all the measurable functions for the discrete perturbation. A tighter certificate
requires additional assumptions on the classifier such as the example in §4.4.
5.2 ImageNet
We conduct experiments on ImageNet [8], a large scale image dataset with 1, 000 labels. Following
common practice, we consider the input space X = {0, 1/255, . . . , 1}224×224×3 by scaling the
images. We consider the same ResNet50 classifier [17] and learning procedure as Cohen et al. [6]
with the only modification on the perturbation distribution. The details and visualizations can be
found in Appendix C.2. For comparison, we report the best guaranteed accuracy of each method for
each `0 radius r in Table 2. Our model outperforms the competitor by a large margin at r = 1 (0.538
vs. 0.372), and consistently outperforms the baseline across different radii.
Table 2: The guaranteed accuracy of randomly smoothed ResNet50 models on ImageNet.
φ and certificate ACC@r
r = 1 r = 2 r = 3 r = 4 r = 5 r = 6 r = 7
D 0.538 0.394 0.338 0.274 0.234 0.190 0.176
N [6] 0.372 0.292 0.226 0.194 0.170 0.154 0.138
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Figure 3: Analysis of the proposed method in the ImageNet dataset.
Analysis. We analyze our method in ImageNet in terms of 1) the number n of nonempty likelihood
ratio region L(u, v; r) in Algorithm 1, 2) the computed ρ−1r (0.5), and 3) the certified accuracy at each
α. The results are in Figure 3. 1) The number n of nonempty likelihood ratio regions is much smaller
than the bound (d + 1)2 = (3 × 224 × 224)2 for small radii. 2) The value ρ−1r (0.5) approaches 1
more rapidly for a higher α value than a lower one. Note that ρ−1r (0.5) only reaches 1 when r = d
due to Remark 3. Computing ρ−1r (0.5) in large integer is time-consuming, which takes about 4 days
for each α and r, but this is only computed once and can be parallelized across different α and r.3 3)
The certified accuracy behaves nonlinearly across different radii; relatively, a high α value exhibits a
high certified accuracy at small radii and low certified accuracy at large radii, and vice versa.
5.3 Chemical Property Prediction
The experiment is conducted on the Bace dataset [33], a binary classification dataset for biophysical
property prediction on molecules. We use the Morgan fingerprints [30] to represent molecules, which
are commonly used binary features [39] indicating the presence of various chemical substructures.
The dimension of the features (fingerprints) is 1, 024. Here we focus on an ablation study comparing
the proposed randomly smoothed decision tree with a vanilla decision tree, where the adversary is
found by dynamic programming in §4.4 (thus the exact worse case) and a greedy search, respectively.
More details can be found in Appendix C.3.
Since the chemical property prediction is typically evaluated via AUC [39], we define a robust version
of AUC that takes account of the radius of the adversary as well as the ratio of testing data that can be
manipulated. Note that to maximally decrease the score of AUC via a positive (negative) example,
the adversary only has to maximally decrease (increase) its prediction probability, regardless of the
scores of the other examples. Hence, given an `0 radius r and a ratio of testing data, we first compute
the adversary for each testing data, and then find the combination of adversaries and the clean data
under the ratio constraint that leads to the worst AUC score. See details in Appendix C.4.
The results are in Figure 4. Empirically, the adversary of the decision tree at r = 1 always changes
the prediction probability of a positive (negative) example to 0 (1). Hence, the plots of the decision
tree model are constant across different `0 radii. The randomly smoothed decision tree is consistently
more robust than the vanilla decision tree model. We also compare the exact certificate of the
prediction probability with the one derived from Lemma 1; the average difference across the training
data is 0.358 and 0.402 when r equals to 1 and 2, respectively. The phenomenon encourages the
development of a classifier-aware guarantee that is tighter than the classifier-agnostic guarantee.
3As a side note, computing ρ−1r (0.5) in MNIST takes less than 1 second for each α and r.
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Figure 4: The guaranteed AUC in the Bace dataset across different `0 radius r and the ratio of testing
data that the adversary can manipulate.
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6 Conclusion
We present a stratified approach to certifying the robustness of randomly smoothed classifiers, where
the robustness guarantees can be obtained in various resolutions and perspectives, ranging from
a pointwise certificate to a regional certificate and from general results to specific examples. The
hierarchical investigation opens up many avenues for future extensions at different levels.
References
[1] G. W. Bemis and M. A. Murcko. The properties of known drugs. 1. molecular frameworks.
Journal of medicinal chemistry, 39(15):2887–2893, 1996.
[2] X. Cao and N. Z. Gong. Mitigating evasion attacks to deep neural networks via region-based
classification. In Proceedings of the 33rd Annual Computer Security Applications Conference,
pages 278–287. ACM, 2017.
[3] N. Carlini, G. Katz, C. Barrett, and D. L. Dill. Provably minimally-distorted adversarial
examples. arXiv preprint arXiv:1709.10207, 2017.
[4] C.-H. Cheng, G. Nührenberg, and H. Ruess. Maximum resilience of artificial neural networks.
In International Symposium on Automated Technology for Verification and Analysis, pages
251–268. Springer, 2017.
[5] C. J. Clopper and E. S. Pearson. The use of confidence or fiducial limits illustrated in the case
of the binomial. Biometrika, 26(4):404–413, 1934.
[6] J. M. Cohen, E. Rosenfeld, and J. Z. Kolter. Certified adversarial robustness via randomized
smoothing. arXiv preprint arXiv:1902.02918, 2019.
[7] F. Croce, M. Andriushchenko, and M. Hein. Provable robustness of relu networks via maxi-
mization of linear regions. the 22nd International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and
Statistics, 2018.
[8] J. Deng, W. Dong, R. Socher, L.-J. Li, K. Li, and L. Fei-Fei. Imagenet: A large-scale hierarchical
image database. In Proceedings of the IEEE international conference on computer vision, pages
248–255. Ieee, 2009.
[9] S. Dutta, S. Jha, S. Sankaranarayanan, and A. Tiwari. Output range analysis for deep feedforward
neural networks. In NASA Formal Methods Symposium, pages 121–138. Springer, 2018.
[10] K. Dvijotham, S. Gowal, R. Stanforth, R. Arandjelovic, B. O’Donoghue, J. Uesato, and P. Kohli.
Training verified learners with learned verifiers. arXiv preprint arXiv:1805.10265, 2018.
[11] K. Dvijotham, R. Stanforth, S. Gowal, T. Mann, and P. Kohli. A dual approach to scalable veri-
fication of deep networks. the 34th Annual Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence,
2018.
[12] R. Ehlers. Formal verification of piece-wise linear feed-forward neural networks. In Inter-
national Symposium on Automated Technology for Verification and Analysis, pages 269–286.
Springer, 2017.
[13] C. Finlay, A.-A. Pooladian, and A. M. Oberman. The logbarrier adversarial attack: making
effective use of decision boundary information. arXiv preprint arXiv:1903.10396, 2019.
[14] M. Fischetti and J. Jo. Deep neural networks and mixed integer linear optimization. Constraints,
23:296–309, 2018.
[15] I. Goodfellow, J. Shlens, and C. Szegedy. Explaining and harnessing adversarial examples. In
International Conference on Learning Representations, 2015.
[16] S. Gowal, K. Dvijotham, R. Stanforth, R. Bunel, C. Qin, J. Uesato, T. Mann, and P. Kohli. On
the effectiveness of interval bound propagation for training verifiably robust models. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1810.12715, 2018.
[17] K. He, X. Zhang, S. Ren, and J. Sun. Deep residual learning for image recognition. In
Proceedings of the IEEE conference on computer vision and pattern recognition, pages 770–
778, 2016.
9
[18] G. Katz, C. Barrett, D. L. Dill, K. Julian, and M. J. Kochenderfer. Reluplex: An efficient smt
solver for verifying deep neural networks. In International Conference on Computer Aided
Verification, pages 97–117. Springer, 2017.
[19] M. Lecuyer, V. Atlidakis, R. Geambasu, D. Hsu, and S. Jana. Certified robustness to adversarial
examples with differential privacy. IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), 2019.
[20] G.-H. Lee, D. Alvarez-Melis, and T. S. Jaakkola. Towards robust, locally linear deep networks.
In International Conference on Learning Representations, 2019.
[21] B. Li, C. Chen, W. Wang, and L. Carin. Second-order adversarial attack and certifiable
robustness. arXiv preprint arXiv:1809.03113, 2018.
[22] X. Liu, M. Cheng, H. Zhang, and C.-J. Hsieh. Towards robust neural networks via random
self-ensemble. In Proceedings of the European Conference on Computer Vision (ECCV), pages
369–385, 2018.
[23] A. Lomuscio and L. Maganti. An approach to reachability analysis for feed-forward relu neural
networks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1706.07351, 2017.
[24] A. Madry, A. Makelov, L. Schmidt, D. Tsipras, and A. Vladu. Towards deep learning models
resistant to adversarial attacks. In International Conference on Learning Representations, 2018.
[25] M. Mirman, T. Gehr, and M. Vechev. Differentiable abstract interpretation for provably robust
neural networks. In International Conference on Machine Learning, pages 3575–3583, 2018.
[26] J. Neyman and E. S. Pearson. Ix. on the problem of the most efficient tests of statistical
hypotheses. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series A, Containing
Papers of a Mathematical or Physical Character, 231(694-706):289–337, 1933.
[27] A. Paszke, S. Gross, S. Chintala, G. Chanan, E. Yang, Z. DeVito, Z. Lin, A. Desmaison,
L. Antiga, and A. Lerer. Automatic differentiation in pytorch. 2017.
[28] A. Raghunathan, J. Steinhardt, and P. Liang. Certified defenses against adversarial examples.
International Conference on Learning Representations, 2018.
[29] A. Raghunathan, J. Steinhardt, and P. S. Liang. Semidefinite relaxations for certifying robustness
to adversarial examples. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, pages 10877–
10887, 2018.
[30] D. Rogers and M. Hahn. Extended-connectivity fingerprints. Journal of chemical information
and modeling, 50(5):742–754, 2010.
[31] K. Scheibler, L. Winterer, R. Wimmer, and B. Becker. Towards verification of artificial neural
networks. In MBMV, pages 30–40, 2015.
[32] G. Singh, T. Gehr, M. Mirman, M. Püschel, and M. Vechev. Fast and effective robustness
certification. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, pages 10802–10813,
2018.
[33] G. Subramanian, B. Ramsundar, V. Pande, and R. A. Denny. Computational modeling of β-
secretase 1 (bace-1) inhibitors using ligand based approaches. Journal of chemical information
and modeling, 56(10):1936–1949, 2016.
[34] V. Tjeng, K. Xiao, and R. Tedrake. Evaluating robustness of neural networks with mixed integer
programming. International Conference on Learning Representations, 2017.
[35] K. Tocher. Extension of the neyman-pearson theory of tests to discontinuous variates.
Biometrika, 37(1/2):130–144, 1950.
[36] T.-W. Weng, H. Zhang, H. Chen, Z. Song, C.-J. Hsieh, D. Boning, I. S. Dhillon, and L. Daniel.
Towards fast computation of certified robustness for relu networks. the 35th International
Conference on Machine Learning, 2018.
[37] E. Wong and J. Z. Kolter. Provable defenses against adversarial examples via the convex outer
adversarial polytope. the 35th International Conference on Machine Learning, 2018.
[38] E. Wong, F. Schmidt, J. H. Metzen, and J. Z. Kolter. Scaling provable adversarial defenses. In
Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, pages 8400–8409, 2018.
[39] Z. Wu, B. Ramsundar, E. N. Feinberg, J. Gomes, C. Geniesse, A. S. Pappu, K. Leswing, and
V. Pande. Moleculenet: a benchmark for molecular machine learning. Chemical science,
9(2):513–530, 2018.
10
[40] H. Zhang, T.-W. Weng, P.-Y. Chen, C.-J. Hsieh, and L. Daniel. Efficient neural network
robustness certification with general activation functions. In Advances in Neural Information
Processing Systems, pages 4939–4948, 2018.
11
A Proofs
To simplify exposition, we use [n] to denote the set {1, 2, . . . , n}.
A.1 The proof of Lemma 1
Proof. ∀f¯ ∈ F , We may rewrite the probabilities in an integral form:
Pr(f¯(φ(x)) = y) =
n∑
i=1
∫
Li
Pr(φ(x) = z) Pr(f¯(z) = y)dz,
Pr(f¯(φ(x¯)) = y) =
n∑
i=1
∫
Li
Pr(φ(x¯) = z) Pr(f¯(z) = y)dz
Note that for all possible f¯ ∈ F , we can re-assign all the function output within a likelihood region to
be constant without affecting Pr(f¯(φ(x)) = y) and Pr(f¯(φ(x¯)) = y). Concretely, we define f¯ ′ as
Pr(f¯ ′(z) = y) =
∫
Li Pr(φ(x) = z) Pr(f¯(z) = y)dz∫
Li Pr(φ(x) = z)dz
,∀z′ ∈ Li,∀i ∈ [n],
then we have∫
Li
Pr(φ(x) = z) Pr(f¯(z) = y)dz =
∫
Li
Pr(φ(x) = z) Pr(f¯ ′(z) = y)dz
Since in Li, Pr(φ(x) = z)/Pr(φ(x¯) = z) is constant, we also have∫
Li
Pr(φ(x¯) = z) Pr(f¯(z) = y)dz =
∫
Li
Pr(φ(x¯) = z) Pr(f¯ ′(z) = y)dz
Therefore,
Pr(f¯(φ(x)) = y) = Pr(f¯ ′(φ(x)) = y), and
Pr(f¯(φ(x¯)) = y) = Pr(f¯ ′(φ(x¯)) = y).
Hence, it suffices to consider the following program
(I) , min
g:[n]→[0,1]
n∑
i=1
∫
Li
Pr(φ(x¯) = z)g(i)dz,
s.t.
n∑
i=1
∫
Li
Pr(φ(x) = z)g(i)dz = p,
where the optimum is equivalent to the program
min
f¯∈F :Pr(f¯(φ(x))=y)=p
Pr(f¯(φ(x¯)) = y),
and the each g corresponds to a solution f¯ . For example, the f∗ in the statement corresponds to the
g∗ defined as:
g∗(i) =

1, if i < H∗,
p−∑H∗−1i=1 Pr(φ(x)∈Li)
Pr(φ(x)∈LH∗ ) , if i = H
∗,
0, if i > H∗.
(9)
We may simplify the program as
(I) = min
g:[n]→[0,1]
n∑
i=1
Pr(φ(x¯) ∈ Li)g(i),
s.t.
n∑
i=1
Pr(φ(x) ∈ Li)g(i) = p.
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Clearly, if ηi = 0, all the optimal g will assign g(i) = 0; our solution g∗ satisfies this property since
H∗ , min
H∈{1,...,n}:∑Hi=1 Pr(φ(x)∈Li)≥pH (10)
implies ηH∗ > 0 (otherwise, it implies that Pr(φ(x) ∈ LH∗) = 0 and leads to a contradiction).
Hence, we can ignore the regions with ηi = 0, assume ηn > 0, and simplify program (I) again as
(I) = min
g:[n]→[0,1]
n∑
i=1
1
ηi
Pr(φ(x) ∈ Li)g(ηi), (11)
s.t.
n∑
i=1
Pr(φ(x) ∈ Li)g(ηi) = p. (12)
It is evident that g∗ satisfies the constraint (12), and we will prove that any g 6= g∗ that satisfies
constraint (12) cannot be better.
∀g : [n]→ [0, 1], we define ∆(i) , (g∗(i)− g(i))P (φ(x) ∈ Li). Then we have
n∑
i=1
1
ηi
Pr(φ(x) ∈ Li)g(i) =
n∑
i=1
1
ηi
[
Pr(φ(x) ∈ Li)g∗(i)−∆(i)
]
=
H∗∑
i=1
1
ηi
Pr(φ(x) ∈ Li)g∗(i)−
n∑
i=1
1
ηi
∆(i). (13)
Note that ∆(i) ≥ 0 for i < H∗, ∆(i) ≤ 0 for i > H∗, and ∑ni=1 ∆(ηi) = 0 due to the constraint
(12). Therefore, we have
n∑
i=1
1
ηi
∆(ηi) ≤
n∑
i=1
1
ηH∗
∆(ηi) = 0. (14)
Finally, combining (13) and (14),
n∑
i=1
1
ηi
Pr(φ(x) ∈ Li)g(i) ≥
H∗∑
i=1
1
ηi
Pr(φ(x) ∈ Li)g∗(i). (15)
A.2 The proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Given a point of interest x and its prediction probability p for a class y, the worst case
prediction probability ρx,x¯(p) at another point x¯ has an analytical solution via Lemma 1 since there
are only 3 possible likelihood ratios ηx,x¯(z) in the space: ∞, 1, and 0. Note that for all z such
that Pr(φ(x) = z) = Pr(φ(x¯) = z) = 0, we can define ηx,x¯(z) = 0. If we denote the `∞-balls
with radius γ around x and x¯ as B1 and B2, respectively, then we can make L1 = B1\B2,L2 =
B1 ∩ B2,L3 = B2\B1, and L4 = X\(B1 ∪ B2) as illustrated in Figure 1. Using Lemma 1, we have{
ρx,x¯(p) = 0, if 0 ≤ p ≤ Pr(φ(x) ∈ L1),
ρx,x¯(p) = p− Pr(φ(x) ∈ L1), if 1 ≥ p > Pr(φ(x) ∈ L1),
where Pr(φ(x) ∈ L1) = Vol(B1\B2)/Vol(B1) and Vol(B1) is a constant given γ. Hence, the
minimizers of minx¯∈Br,q(x) ρx,x¯(p) are simply the points that maximize the volume of B1\B2, or,
equivalently, minimize the volume of B1 ∩ B2. Below we re-write x¯ as x+ δ.
Case q = 1: ∀r > 0, we want to find a δ s.t., ‖δ‖1 = r and the overlapping region is minimized: (By
symmetry, we assume that δi ≥ 0 for all i)
arg min
δ≥0:‖δ‖1=r
d∏
i=1
(2γ − δi). (16)
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Since ∀i, j ∈ [d], i 6= j, we know
(2γ − δi)(2γ − δj) = 4γ2 − (δi + δj) + δiδj ≥ 4γ2 − (δi + δj). (17)
So we can always move the mass of δj to δi to further decrease the product value. That means,
δ1 = r, δi = 0,∀i 6= 1 minimizes Eq. (16) for a given r. As a result, we know
sup r, s.t. min
δ:‖δ‖1≤r
ρx,x+δ(p) > 0.5 (18)
= sup r, s.t. p−
(
1− (2γ)
d−1(2γ − r)
(2γ)d
)
> 0.5 (19)
=2pγ − γ (20)
Case q =∞: Similarly, for q =∞ case, we want to find a δ with ‖δ‖∞ = r, and the following is
minimized: (by symmetry we assume δi ≥ 0 for all i)
arg min
δ≥0:‖δ‖∞=r
d∏
i=1
(2γ − δi).
In this case, we should set δi = r for all i, which means
sup r, s.t. min
δ:‖δ‖∞≤r
ρx,x+δ(p) > 0.5 (21)
= sup r, s.t. p−
(
1− (2γ − r)
d
(2γ)d
)
> 0.5 (22)
= sup r, s.t.
(2γ − r)d
(2γ)d
> 1.5− p (23)
It remains to see that
(2γ − r)d
(2γ)d
> 1.5− p
⇐⇒ 2γ − r > 2γ(1.5− p)1/d
⇐⇒ 2γ−2γ(1.5− p)1/d > r.
A.3 The proof of Lemma 5
Proof. If ϕ(·) is defined as Eq. (6), ∀x, x¯ ∈ X such that ‖x− x¯‖0 = r, below we show that ρx,x¯ is
independent of x and x¯. Indeed, since ‖x− x¯‖0 is the number of non-zero elements of x− x¯, we
know there are exactly r dimensions such that x and x¯ do not match. Notice that ϕ(·) applies to each
dimension of x independently, so we can safely ignore any correlations between two dimensions.
Therefore, by the symmetry of the perturbation, we can rearrange the order of coordinates, and
assume x and x¯ differ for the first r dimensions, and match for the rest d− r dimensions.
Notice that the perturbation ϕ(·) has the nice property that the perturbing probabilities are oblivious
to the actual values of the input. Therefore, by the definition of xC , x¯C , we know that they are the
canonical form of all pairs of x and x¯ such that ‖x− x¯‖0 = r; hence, ρx,x¯(p) is constant and equals
ρr(p) for every p ∈ [0, 1].
A.4 The proof of Lemma 6
Proof. In this proof, we adopt the notation of the canonical form xC and x¯C from Appendix A.3.
Recall that xC is a zero vector, and x¯C has the first r entries equal to 1 and the last d − r entries
equal to 0. We use the likelihood tuple (u, v) to refer the scenario when xC “flips” u coordinates (the
likelihood is αd−uβu), and x¯C “flips” v coordinates (the likelihood is αd−vβv). Note that u ≤ v by
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assumption. For r ∈ [d] and (u, v) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , d}2, the number of possible outcome z ∈ X with
the likelihood tuple (u, v) can be computed in the following way:
|L(u, v; r)| =
min(u,d−r)∑
i=0
u−i∑
j=0
(K − 1)jI((u− i− j) + (v − i− j) + j = r)r!
(u− i− j)!(v − i− j)!j!
Ki(d− r)!
(d− r − i)!i! ,
where the first summation and the term
Ki(d− r)!
(d− r − i)!i!
correspond to the case where i entries out of the last (d − r) coordinates in xC and x¯C are both
modified. Notice that xC and x¯C are equal in the last d − r dimensions, so if xC has i entries
modified among them, in order to ensure that x¯C equals xC after modification, x¯C should have
exactly the same i entries modified as well (in order to become the same z in Eq. (7)).
The second summation and the term
(K − 1)jI((u− i− j) + (v − i− j) + j = r)r!
(u− i− j)!(v − i− j)!j!
corresponds to the case where j entries out of the first r coordinates of xC and x¯C are modified to
any values other than {0, 1}, u− i− j entries in xC are modified to 1, and v− i− j entries in x¯C are
modified to 0. By the same analysis, we know that both xC and x¯C should have exactly the same j
entries modified to any value other than {0, 1}. The indicator function I((u−i−j)+(v−i−j)+j = r)
simplify verifies that whether the value of j is valid. Note that these two summations have covered
all possible cases of modifications on xC and x¯C in L(u, v; r).
After fixing the value of i and j, each summand is simply calculating the number of symmetric
cases. (K − 1)j means there are j entries modified to (K − 1) possible values. r!(u−i−j)!(v−i−j)!j!
is the number of possible configurations for the first r coordinates. Ki means there are i entries
momdified to K possible values. (d−r)!(d−r−1)!i! is the number of possible configurations for the last d− r
coordinates.
Now it remains to simplify the expression. Let j∗ , u+ v − 2i− r, we have
|L(u, v; r)| =
min(u,d−r)∑
i=0
I(j∗ ≥ 0)I(j∗ ≤ u− i)(K − 1)j∗r!
(u− i− j∗)!(v − i− j∗)!j∗!
Ki(d− r)!
(d− r − i)!i! ,
=
min(u,d−r)∑
i=max{0,v−r}
I(j∗ ≥ 0)(K − 1)j∗r!
(u− i− j∗)!(v − i− j∗)!j∗!
Ki(d− r)!
(d− r − i)!i! ,
=
min(u,d−r,bu+v−r2 c)∑
i=max{0,v−r}
(K − 1)j∗r!
(u− i− j∗)!(v − i− j∗)!j∗!
Ki(d− r)!
(d− r − i)!i! . (24)
Moreover, we know that |L(u, v; r)| = |L(v, u; r)| holds by the symmetry between xC and x¯C .
B Algorithms For Decision Tree
B.1 Dynamic Programming For Restricted Decision Tree
Given an input x ∈ X , we run dynamic programming (Algorithm 2) for computing the certificate,
based on the same idea mentioned in Section 4.4.
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Algorithm 2 DP(x, i, R)
1: if i is leaf then
2: for r = 1, · · · , R do
3: adv[i, r] =Leaf-Output(i)
4: end for
5: Return
6: end if
7: rw = αI{xidx[i]=1}βI{xidx[i]=0}
8: lw = αI{xidx[i]=0}βI{xidx[i]=1}
9: DP(x, right[i], R)
10: DP(x, left[i], R)
11: for r = 1, · · · , R do
12: adv[i, r] = 1
13: for r¯ = 0, · · · r do
14: adv[i, r] = min{adv[i, r], rw ∗ adv[right[i], r¯] + lw ∗ adv[left[i], r − r¯]}
15: end for
16: for r¯ = 0, · · · r − 1 do
17: adv[i, r] = min{adv[i, r], lw ∗ adv[right[i], r¯] + rw ∗ adv[left[i], r − 1− r¯]}
18: end for
19: end for
We use adv[i, r] to denote the worst prediction at node i if at most r features can be perturbed.
Algorithm 2 uses the following updating rule for adv[i, r].
adv[i, r] = min{
min
r¯∈{0,1,...,r}
{αI{xidx[i]=1}βI{xidx[i]=0}adv[right[i], r¯] + αI{xidx[i]=0}βI{xidx[i]=1}adv[left[i], r − r¯]},
min
r¯∈{0,1,...,r−1}
{αI{xidx[i]=0}βI{xidx[i]=1}adv[right[i], r¯] + αI{xidx[i]=1}βI{xidx[i]=0}adv[left[i], r − 1− r¯]}}
There are two cases in this updating rule. In the first case, the feature used at node i is not perturbed,
so it remains to see if we perturb r¯ features in the right subtree and r − r¯ features in the left subtree,
what is the minimum adversarial prediction if r¯ ∈ {0, · · · , r}. In the second case, the feature used
at node i is perturbed, and we check if we perturb r − 1 features in the two subtrees, what is the
minimum adversarial prediction. Combining the two cases together, we get the solution for adv[i, r].
B.2 Training Algorithm For Decision Tree
We consider the perturbation method introduced in Eq. (6): for every coordinate in a given input
x, we may perturb its value with probability β. After perturbation, x may arrive at any leaf node,
rather than following one specific path as in the standard decision tree. Therefore, when training, we
maintain the probability of arriving at the current tree node for every input x, denoted as probs. The
probability is multiplied by α or β after each layer, depending on the input and the feature used for
the current tree node. See Algorithm 3 for details.
The overall framework of Algorithm 3 is standard: we run breadth-first search on the tree nodes,
and pick the best splitting feature every time. However, when picking the best splitting feature, the
standard decision tree uses Gini impurity based on all the remaining training data that will follow the
path from the root to the current tree node. In our algorithm, this will include all the training data, but
with different arriving probabilities. Therefore, we apply the weighted Gini impurity metric instead.
Specifically, for feature idx, its weighted Gini impurity is (after probs is updated with idx):
1−
(∑
x∈X ,y=1 probs[x]∑
x∈X probs[x]
)2
−
(∑
x∈X ,y=0 probs[x]∑
x∈X probs[x]
)2
When the arriving probability for each x is restricted to be either 0 or 1, this definition becomes the
standard Gini impurity.
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Algorithm 3 Train(X ,Y , maxdep)
1: Q = [(root, 0, [1, 1, · · · , 1])]
2: while Q is not Empty do
3: i, dep, probs = Q.pop()
4: if dep=maxdep then
5: Assign-Leaf-Node(i, probs)
6: Continue
7: end if
8: f-list = Get-available-features()
9: for idx in f-list do
10: list = [(y, αI{xidx=1}βI{xidx=0}probs[x]) for (x, y) in X]
11: idx∗ = Update-best-feature-score (idx, list, idx∗)
12: end for
13: idx[i]= idx∗
14: left-probs=probs
15: right-probs=probs
16: for x in X do
17: if xidx = 1 then
18: left-probs[x] =left-probs[x] ∗ α
19: right-probs[x] =right-probs[x] ∗ β
20: else
21: right-probs[x] =right-probs[x] ∗ α
22: left-probs[x] =left-probs[x] ∗ β
23: end if
24: end for
25: Q.push(left[i], dep + 1, left-probs)
26: Q.push(right[i], dep + 1, right-probs)
27: end while
C Experimental Details
C.1 Supplementary Materials for the MNIST Experiment
For the MNIST experiment, we use a simple 4-layer convolutional network, where the first two layers
are convolutional layers, and the last two layers are feedforward layers. For the two convolutional lay-
ers, we use kernel size 5, and output channels 20 and 50, respectively. For the two feedforward layers,
we use 500 hidden nodes. We tune the hyperparameter α ∈ {0.72, 0.76, 0.80, 0.84, 0.88, 0.92, 0.96}
for µ(R) in the validation set using the certificates from the Gaussian perturbation [6]. The resulting
α is 0.8. We also train a CNN with an isotropic Gaussian with the σ that corresponds to α = 0.8 (see
§4.3).
The learning procedure for all the models are the same (except the perturbation). The batch size is 400.
We train each model for 30 epochs with the SGD optimizer with Nesterov momentum (momentum =
0.9). The learning rate is initially set to be 0.05 and annealed by a factor of 10 for every 10 epochs of
training. The models are implemented in PyTorch [27], and run on single GPU with 12G memory.
C.2 Supplementary Materials for the ImageNet Experiment
We use the PyTorch [27] implementation provided by Cohen et al. [6] as the barebone and implement
our algorithm based on their pipeline. Thus, the training details are consistent to the one report in
their paper except that we use a different perturbation. Here, we summarize some important details.
ResNet-50 is used as the base classifier for our ImageNet experiment, whose architecture is provided
in torchvision. After the perturbation is done, we normalize each image by subtracting the dataset
mean (0.485, 0.456, 0.406) and dividing by the standard deviation (0.229, 0.224, 0.225). Parameters
are optimized by SGD with momentum set as 0.9. The learning rate is initially set to be 0.1 and
annealed by a factor of 10 for every 30 epochs of training. The total number of training epochs is
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Figure 5: ImageNet images additively corrupted by varying levels of discrete perturbation variable α.
90. The batch size is 300, parallelized across 2 GPUs. We tune α ∈ {0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5} for the
discrete perturbation, and measure the performance in ACC@r, compared to the classifier under an
isotropic Gaussian perturbation [6].4 The visualizations of the perturbed images for each α are in
Figure 5. We follow the prior work [6] to evaluate every 100th image in the validation set.
C.3 Supplementary Materials for the Chemical Property Prediction Experiment
The dataset contains 1, 513 molecules (data points). We split the data into the training, validation,
and testing sets with the ratio 0.8, 0,1, and 0,1, respectively. Following common practice in chemical
property prediction [39], the splitting is done based on the Bemis-Murcko scaffold [1]; the molecules
within a split are inside different scaffolds from the other splits. We refer the details of scaffold
splitting to [39]. We observe similar experiment results when we use a random split.
For both the decision tree and the randomly smoothed decision tree, we tune the depth limit in
{6, 7, 8, 9, 10}. For the randomly smoothed decision tree, we also tune α ∈ {0.7, 0.75, 0.8, 0.85, 0.9}.
The tuned α is 0.8, and the tuned depth limits are 10 for both models.
C.4 Computing Adversarial AUC
Assume that there are n + m data points, n of them are positive instances, denoted as A ,
{x1, · · · , xn}, and m of them are negative instances, denoted B , {xn+1, · · · , xn+m}. Denote
the whole dataset as X , A ∪B. For data point x ∈ X , we may adversarially perturb x up to the
perturbation radius r, denoted as xr. Note that, since Y is binary, maximizing the probability for
predicting one class can be equivalently done by minimizing the probability for predicting the other
class. Hence, we may use Algorithm 2 to find the adversaries for both the positive and negative
examples. Below we use the prediction probability for the class 1 as the score. Denote the score of x
and xr as s(x) and s(xr). For x ∈ A, we know that s(x) ≥ s(xr), and for x ∈ B, s(x) ≤ s(xr).
If we are only allowed to perturb k < n + m data points, to minimize AUC, we aim to solve the
following program:
minimize
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
[
aibj Iˆ(s(xri ), s(xrj+n)) + ai(1− bj)Iˆ(s(xri ), s(xj+n))
+(1− ai)bj Iˆ(s(xi), s(xrj+n)) + (1− ai)(1− bj)Iˆ(s(xi), s(xj+n))
]
subject to
∑
i∈[n]
ai +
∑
j∈[m]
bj ≤ k,
ai ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, ..., n
bj ∈ {0, 1}, j = 1, ...,m
We may use standard mixed-integer programming solvers like Gurobi to solve the program. Here
we use ai to denote whether data point xi ∈ A is perturbed, and bj to denote whether data point
4We run their released model from https://github.com/locuslab/smoothing.
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xj+n ∈ B is perturbed. The function Iˆ(x, x′) is an indicator function defined as
Iˆ(x, x′) ,

1, if x > x′,
0.5 if x = x′,
0, if x < x′.
(25)
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